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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this study, we examine characteristics of Specified Purpose Acquisition 
Companies (SPACs) used as a financing tool for companies from China in period 
2004-2011. We offer the evidence that, similarly to evidence from studies on 
reverse mergers focusing on China, SPACs that focus on China are not different 
in their characteristics from other SPACs. We test for the performance of the 
SPACs focused on China and show that their performance is not inferior to the 
performance of other SPACs. On the contrary, an investment in the equally 
weighted portfolio of SPACs with focus on China provides higher absolute return 
than an investment in the equally weighted portfolio of other SPACs. This 
evidence establishes that, on average, SPACs focused on China are as equally a 
valid investment choice as any other SPAC. 
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SPACs with focus on China 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
“Origin is formed by special purpose acquisition 
company, not RTO (reverse takeover)” Irving Kau, CFO of 
Origin Agritech, June 10th, 2011, in response to the alert of 
the Security and Exchange Commission to investors on 
June 8th 20112 
 
This paper studies a subset of Specified Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) that 
focused their merger activities on China. First, examining how SPACs, new class of financial 
assets and advanced form of reverse merger companies perform and enable private companies 
from China to access the US financial markets is interesting endeavor. Second, the continuous 
delisting of Chinese companies that entered the U.S. capital market through reverse mergers 
during 2011 and ruling of the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC)3 on the imposition of 
stricter listing requirements for these companies creates additional reasons to explore the 
behavior of SPACs with merging focus on private companies from China. Finally, it is also 
worthwhile to distinguish between practices and institutional structure of standard reverse 
merger companies and SPACs.  
2 http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/reversemergers.pdf 
3 In November 2011 , the SEC issued , the following release notes 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasdaq/2011/34-65708.pdf 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/2011/34-65709.pdf 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyseamex/2011/34-65710.pdf 
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Documenting the characteristics of this new financial asset is important especially since 
existing evidence questions that SPACs are successful alternative methods of obtaining listings 
in the US capital markets. 
This study shows the evidence that SPACs with focus on China have the same 
characteristics as the rest of the SPACs entering the U.S. capital markets. In addition, trading 
securities of SPACs focused on China do not exhibit underperformance over the observation 
period compared to the returns of SPACs' securities for the rest of the sample. This evidence 
establishes that, on average, SPACs focused on China are as equally a valid investment choice as 
any other SPAC. 
The SEC distinguishes “shell companies” used in reverse merger transactions and 
governed by Rule 405 and Rule 12b-2 and “blank checks” 4 of which SPACs are a subgroup by 
SEC classification. 5  However, investors have hard time distinguishing reverse mergers and 
SPACs. For example, the executive of Origin Agritech used the media to emphasize that his 
company is a SPAC, not a reverse merger to avoid the pressure on the Origin Agritech price 
caused by the SEC’s announcements on improper behavior of Chinese reverse mergers. 
Consequently, the CFO of Origin Agritech announced that the company would buy back shares 
in the market to fend the impact of the SEC announcement and relieve sellers’ pressure. 
SPACs, in essence, mimic Rule 419 of the Securities Act of 1933. However, because 
SPACs issue shares at the price higher than $5 in the IPO, they are not required to comply with 
the rules that govern other “blank checks” and penny stock companies. 
4 http://www.sec.gov/answers/blankcheck.htm  
A blank check company is a development stage company that has no specific business plan or purpose or has 
indicated its business plan is to engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified company or companies, other 
entity, or person. These companies typically involve speculative investments and often fall within the SEC’s 
definition of "penny stocks" or are considered "microcap stocks." 
5 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2005-07-21/pdf/05-14311.pdf 
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SPACs are types of blank check companies.6 According to the SEC, “A SPAC is created 
specifically to pool funds in order to finance a merger or acquisition opportunity within a set 
timeframe. The opportunity usually has yet to be identified.”7 To make a SPAC viable asset for 
investors, SPAC sponsors make them subject to additional requirements for the protection of 
investors other than ones imposed by the SEC. The requirements include depositing most of the 
raised funds in an escrow account until the acquisition is agreed to and requiring shareholder 
approval of any identified acquisition. 
SPACs, in the current form, entered financial markets in August 2003 when Millstream 
Acquisition conducted the Initial Public Offering (IPO) and raised approximately $ 24 million to 
be used with the solely purpose to acquire another company within the defined time. Millstream 
focused on merging and acquiring companies in the healthcare sector. The second SPAC to enter 
the US capital markets was CEA Acquisition in February 2004. Chardan China is the third SPAC 
to enter the US financial market and conducted its IPO on March 12, 2004. It became the first 
SPAC interested in merging with companies in China.8 By 2011, 184 SPACs entered the U.S. 
capital markets, 41 of them focused on China.  
This paper examines SPACs formed with the purpose of acquiring and merging with 
companies in China. This analysis will help to answer the following questions: are they different 
6 SPACs can operate as blank check companies, which the SEC defines as companies that either have no specific 
business plan or purpose, or have indicated that their business plan is to engage in a merger or acquisition with an 
unidentified company or companies, and are issuing "penny stock" as defined in Exchange Act Rule 3a51-1. If a 
SPAC meets the definition of a blank check company, it would be required to comply with Rule 419 under the 
Securities Act of 1933, which requires investors' funds to be held in escrow, filing of a post-effective amendment 
upon execution of an acquisition agreement, and the return of the escrowed funds if an acquisition has not occurred 
within 18 months of the effective date of the initial registration statement. Most SPACs, however, are not required to 
comply with Rule 419 because they are structured so that they can rely on an exception from the definition of 
"penny stock" or they meet other exceptions for listed companies 
7 http://www.sec.gov/answers/blankcheck.htm 
8 The description of intentions in prospectuses form filed on behalf of Chardan China to the SEC states “We are a 
blank check company organized under the laws of the State of Delaware on December 5, 2003. We were formed to 
effect a merger, capital stock exchange, asset acquisition or other similar business combination with an operating 
business that has its primary operating facilities located in China. To date, our efforts have been limited to 
organizational activities”. 
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companies than other SPACs focusing their mergers elsewhere?; what are the main features of 
SPACs that focus on China?; what is the performance of China focused SPACs compared to 
others. 
The paper is structured as follows: Part two provides an overview of the current literature 
on SPACs and reverse mergers that focus on China. In part three, we explain the data collection 
process. In section four, we explain in detail the characteristics of SPACs across the sample and 
conduct a comparison between SPACs that focus their operations on China and the remaining 
SPACs from 2003 to 2012. Part five documents the performance characteristics of SPACs. 
Finally, part six provides the conclusion. 
     2.  Review of Literature 
Two related streams of literature are important for our study. The first stream includes 
recent studies on reverse mergers with a focus on China triggered by SEC actions during 2011. 
The second stream includes literature on SPACs.  
To answer if Chinese reverse mergers are institutionally and performance-wise different 
from other reverse mergers Jindra et al. (2012) analyzes the characteristics of Chinese focused 
reverse mergers. He compares those characteristics to characteristics of Chinese firms that 
attained U.S. exchange listing through traditional IPO. They find that Chinese reverse mergers 
are significantly smaller, more levered, with lower analysts and institutional following. Chinese 
reverse mergers face higher lawsuit probability than traditional IPO’s of Chinese companies in 
the U.S. markets. 
Darrough (2012) evaluates how recent reports about fraud on Chinese reverse mergers 
influences Chinese companies that previously entered US capital markets as well as Chinese 
companies that entered the U.S. capital markets through standard IPO. They report that not only 
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the value of suspicious Chinese reverse mergers decreases, but also the value of non-fraudulent 
Chinese reverse merger companies. The degree of impact depends on the quality and reputation 
of the auditor and its location. They find that negative news reporting does not affect the value of 
non-Chinese reverse mergers. 
Lee (2013) examines performance and characteristics of reverse merger companies that 
went public between 2001 and 2010, with a special focus on reverse mergers that involved 
companies from China. According to their findings, reverse mergers focused on China are not 
inferior to the rest of categories of reverse mergers. Chinese reverse mergers are more mature 
and outperform the rest of reverse merger companies over the observation period. Lee (2013) 
concluded that the presence of Chinese reverse mergers does not diminish the quality of capital 
markets in the US and that some negative publicity emerges from activities of the short sellers to 
bash these companies. 
Chen (2012) studies the quality of financial reporting of Chinese reverse mergers and 
finds that their reporting quality is lower than any other benchmarked set of companies. 
Research on SPACs up-to-date focuses on few dimensions. Literature explained 
institutional characteristics of SPACs and their changes through time, performance of their 
securities at different points of their corporate life, mergers characteristics, and post-merger 
performance. 
Jog and Sun (2007), Boyer and Baigent (2008) discuss the institutional characteristics of 
SPACs. These studies were the first papers on finance literature that explored SPACs.9 Both 
papers explain the structure of SPAC deals and outline the potential reasons why investors are 
subscribing to these companies. For the available sample, Jog and Sun (2007) report that SPACs 
9 Papers in law literature discuss SPACs prior to finance literature such as : Davidoff (2007) Hale (2007), Heyman 
(2007), Reimer (2007), Sjostrom (2007).   
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investors exhibit negative 3% return on initial investments while SPACs founders exhibit up to 
1900% return in the case they were able to execute the merger successfully. Their conclusion is 
that investors in essence write a blank check to SPAC management.  
The Boyer and Baigent (2008) study looks beyond simple returns as a motivation of 
interest of investors in SPACs. They offer at least two good reasons why SPACs are attractive 
investment vehicles. First, due to their reverse merger structure, SPACs enable target companies 
to enter U.S. public financial markets and receive complementary cash raised at the IPO. Second, 
investing in SPACs enables small investors an entrance into private equity. 
Lewellen (2009) studies performance of SPAC’s shares at different stages of their 
corporate life. He provides evidence that investors in SPACs that announced mergers exhibit 
positive 2% return. The paper also reports that SPAC’s post-merger performance is value 
destroying to investors.  
Thompson (2010) expands on previous studies adding information on SPAC founders 
which include their background, underwriting characteristics, and performance of SPACs around 
different announcements and over time. The paper concludes that, overall, SPACs’ investors 
attain positive returns, and that some SPAC deals are approved despite the fact that they are 
value destroying for common shareholders. Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) similarly conclude that 
half of the mergers with SPAC are value destroying. 
Lakicevic and Vulanovic (2013), arguing that documenting  performance of SPAC shares, 
around the important announcements and through time, does not provide complete picture study 
performance of all SPACs issuing securities: shares, warrants and units. They report that 
underperformance of SPAC shares reported in previous studies around important announcements 
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is compensated by the increase in price of warrants and that in overall SPAC investors who 
purchase units at the IPO do not exhibit negative returns at least until the merger event. 
Recently, Cumming et al. (2012) and Lakicevic et al. (2013) examine underlying market 
or SPAC characteristics that influence the success of the merger for SPACs.  Cumming et al. 
(2012) finds that one of the most decisive factors of the merger success is trading patterns of 
institutional investors in SPACs prior to the merger, while Lakicevic et al. (2013) points towards 
the proper selection of underwriter, geographical concerns, and the speed at which SPAC 
managers are able to announce the finding of target. 
Our paper extends the literature in various ways. First, we offer evidence that similarly to 
evidence from studies on reverse mergers focusing on China, SPACs that focus on China are no 
different in their characteristics from other SPACs. We test for the performance of SPACs 
focused on China and show that their performance is not inferior to the performance of the other 
SPACs. On the contrary, an investment in the equally weighted portfolio of SPACs with focus 
on China provides higher absolute returns than an investment in the equally weighted portfolio of 
remaining SPACs. 
     3.    Data 
The data covers the period from August 2003 to January 2012 and includes every SPAC 
that conducted an IPO within that time. We compile the data in the following manner. All 
institutional characteristics of SPACs emerge from The Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and 
Retrieval (EDGAR) database maintained by The Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). We 
collect the latest pre-IPO prospectuses (424 Forms) for all SPACs in the sample. From these 
forms, we extract the relevant information on the deal structure, underwriting characteristics and 
managerial characteristics. We are able to obtain all relevant pre-IPO information for every 
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SPAC in the sample. We also look into EDGAR 8-K forms filed after the IPO in order to extract 
the information after the IPO date on the total gross proceeds considering the overallotment 
option given to underwriters. 
Factiva database is used to locate relevant company announcements such as the letter of 
intent to merge and final merger date. The dates obtained from news sources compiled by 
Factiva are cross checked with the information from the EDGAR database obtained either from 
8-K forms or 10-K forms where SPACs report prior developments. If discrepancy in reporting on 
the date exists, we keep the information from EDGAR.  
To collect data on merger characteristics, we first check 424 prospectuses filed by the SEC 
prior to the merger and extract information on deal size and structure. We update that 
information by checking Forms DEF 14A filed on behalf of SPACs with the SEC prior to 
shareholders meetings where they vote on the proposed deal. Finally, we check post-merger 
filings of 8K Forms for the new company where they report deal information. In parallel, we use 
Thompson One database on mergers and acquisitions to extract merger information. If 
discrepancy between the reported information on merger size exists, we look into additional 
information in Factiva. The Renaissance Capital web-site provides data on the IPO activity.10 
We collect daily pricing data on all three types of the SPAC securities for the two weeks in the 
middle of October 2011. When available, we collect pricing data from The Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP). In the case that CRSP does not record prices, we look into 
Bloomberg. Warrant data is primarily coming from Bloomberg. We cross check all collected 
prices with the data reported by investment banks and one of the major SPAC underwriters 
Joseph Morgan in their daily SPAC updates.11 
10 http://www.renaissancecapital.com/ipohome/press/ipopricings.aspx 
11 http://mjta.com/i/SPAC_Weekly.pdf 
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    4.    Summary Statistics and SPAC Characteristics at the IPO 
This section presents various statistics on SPACs. That enables us to document the 
dynamics of the market and institutional characteristics of modern SPACs overall and across our 
subsamples. 
Table 1 reports statistics on the state of the SPAC market in the period 2003 – 2012 and 
compares it to the overall IPO market in the USA. Two characteristics emerge, IPO volume and 
IPO size. In addition, table 1 reports the relative number of SPACs that focused their business on 
China in respect to the overall SPAC market. Table 1 shows that activity of SPACs was 
increasing year by year in period 2003-2008, with one SPAC going public in 2003 and 66 in 
2008. It also shows that the total amount of money raised by SPACs increased significantly over 
the same period and peaked at $ 12.093 billion in 2008. Comparing the activity in the SPAC IPO 
market with the activity in the overall market, Table 1 reports that SPACs were important in the 
issuance market from 2005 to 2008 and had significant representation in the market, with the 
peak in 2008. In 2008, SPACs represented 35 percent of the total US IPO market deal wise and 
19.9 percent size wise and at the beginning of the year NASDAQ exchange asked for permission 
to list SPACs and be a part of the market,12 joining AMEX exchange.  
4.1 Overall SPAC characteristics 
In this section, we document institutional characteristics for all SPACs that entered US 
capital markets in 2003-2011. Panel A in Table 2 reports overall characteristic of SPACs at the 
IPO date. The panel explains the deal structure of the SPAC, underwriting characteristics and 
managerial characteristics. We have complete information for all 184 SPACs in the sample. 
12 http://ir.nasdaq.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=295473 
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The prospectuses filed by SPACs with the SEC are governing their behavior prior to the 
IPO. The prospectuses include all relevant information that governs the IPO process. In addition, 
the prospectuses explain how the SPAC managers and underwriters comply with the SEC rules 
governing the blank check market. In these prospectuses, SPAC founders explain shareholders’ 
rights during the merger process and define the timeframe for the merger’s execution.  
SPACs access the US capital markets by issuing units. Units are composite security 
consisting of a combination of shares and warrants and used mostly in risky issuance deals.13 
Panel A, Table 2 reports that an overall SPAC issues 14.9 million of units at the IPO date and 
prices them at $8.08. An average SPAC has gross proceeds of $127.83 million, with the range of 
gross proceeds between $9.06 million to $1,035 million. Panel B in Table 2 reports that SPACs 
size was monotonically increasing from the beginning of 2004 to 2008; where in 2008 the 
average SPAC raised $226.03 million.   
On average, 97% of gross proceeds are deposited in escrow accounts14  with credible 
financial institutions for two reasons: to comply with SEC regulations regarding blank check 
issuance and to ensure that investors’ money goes to future acquisition financing. This prevents 
the misuse of investors’ money by shell companies conducting IPO and reverse mergers. In 
addition, new SPAC investors experience significant share dilution by investing in SPACs. As 
reported in previous studies15 SPAC managers on average commit $25000 to purchase complete 
equity of SPACs’ prior to the IPO and retain 20% of the equity at the IPO. New investors 
13 Jain (1994), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997). 
14  Excerpts from Chardan China 424B3 form explaining the use of the funds in escrow accounts “$32,378,000, or 
$37,418,000 if the underwriters' over-allotment option is exercised in full, of net proceeds will be placed in a trust 
account at JPMorgan Chase NY Bank maintained by Continental Stock Transfer & Trust Company, New York, 
New York, as trustee. The proceeds will not be released from the trust account until the earlier of the completion of 
a business combination or our liquidation. The proceeds held in the trust account may be used as consideration to 
pay the sellers of a target business with which we complete a business combination. Excess working capital will be 
sufficient to cover miscellaneous expenses based upon our extensive experience of doing business in Asia”. 
15 Thompson (2011), Lakicevic and Vulanovic (2013). 
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provide all the cash for SPACs but hold approximately 80% of the equity. On average, new 
investors experience 34.13% dilution across the board. 
Panel B reports the dynamics of the percentage of gross proceeds that are deposited in the 
escrow accounts. SPACs in the period of 2008-2001 deposit at least 100% of gross proceeds in 
the trust account, and in the last year even more than 100%. In the first few years of existence, 
only 85% and 87% of the funds went to trust accounts. It is the case that investors in earlier deals 
held more warrants, which compensated the share dilution. 
On average, SPAC units are a combination of 1 common share and 1.3 warrants. The 
range of warrants in unit is between 0.5 and 2. SPACs prior to 2006 usually had 2 warrants in 
units. The average exercise price of these warrants is $6.30 while the average unit issuance price 
is $8.08. Therefore, the majority of these warrants are in money. In Panel B the number of 
warrants decreased monotonically from 2003 to 2011. The strategy of SPAC managers and 
underwriters to decrease the number of warrants in the unit through time can be explained in 
three ways.  
First, the decrease in number of warrants diminishes the power of some hedge fund 
investors whose strategy involves playing the “yield game”16 and generating short-term profits 
instead of focusing on the success of the merger and long-term outcomes.  
Second, the decrease of number of warrants in a unit minimize warrant overhang as a 
potential issue even if the merger is approved and when new company often has to issue 
undervalued shares when warrant holders exercise them. For example, China Gerui Advanced 
16 Yield game is a strategy of hedge funds to sell in the money warrants soon after the IPO of SPAC, and then at the 
shareholders meeting vote against the merger and ask for a redemption of money from the escrow accounts at pro-
rata basis. Given threshold approval requirements this behavior of hedge funds was harming pro-merger investors as 
well as the SPAC founders and underwriters. As response to yield game, the SPACs decreased the number of 
warrants through time or increased the exercise price. Vulanovic (2010) explains the yield game and returns to 
leveraged hedge funds playing that strategy. Cumming et.al (2013) explains how this behavior impacts merger 
outcomes of SPACs 
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Materials Group Limited, a high value-added steel processing company, went public through a 
SPAC China Opportunity Acquisition Corp in March 2009.  About 41 million of shares had also 
16 million in the money warrants with a maturity date in March 2011.17  
An additional support for the warrant overhang theory is the behavior of the exercise price 
of the warrants. While the average exercise price for the warrants issued is $6.30, across the 
sample through time, the exercise price is increasing in both absolute and relative value in terms 
of the unit issuance price. The SPACs in the first few years were selling in the money warrants 
within the unit, while in the later years the warrants are always outside of the money. 
Finally, the SPAC managers and underwriters decreased the number of warrants in a unit 
because post 2005 investors’ interest measured by the number of IPO’s increased significantly. 
SPAC founders are the most important stakeholders. They bring their expertise and the 
ability to increase their wealth and the well-being of investors. Berger (2008) distinguish four 
categories of SPAC founders: accomplished operating executives who want to execute SPAC 
transaction in their industry, unfunded financial sponsors with the vast network of contacts, 
alternative asset managers and corporations that want to capitalize on the deal flow outside their 
core business.18 
For 48 SPACs in the sample, or 26% of total SPAC deals, the founders had previous 
experience in promoting SPACs. At least one of the SPAC founders in the team, for every 
company in the sample, has previous experience in mergers and acquisitions. On average, there 
are 5.91 founders per SPAC, and they are 50.69 years old at the time of filling prospectuses. For 
the period of 2003-2007, there is a pattern of increase in the number of founders of SPACs from 
17 http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1449801/000114420409057739/v165478_424b1.htm 
18 S-1 Forms and 424B prospectuses reveal the names of founders and in the first wave of SPACs some well-known 
are former Apple executives Steve Wozniak, Gilbert Amelio and Ellen Hancock, former undersecretary for federal 
Department of Homeland  Security Asa Hutchinson , CEO of Apollo Investment Corp. Michael Gross, etc. 
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4 in 2003 to 6.52 in 2007. This may add to the argument that SPACs were becoming more 
complex through time and they needed more resources to execute mergers. 
 In a typical SPAC founders purchase all the units at approximately $0.047 on average or 
for a $25000 in total. Later, they sell 80% of the units through the IPO, at the average price of 
$8.08. 
In the first few years of modern SPACs, investors were willing to accept the fact that 
founders contribute only the minimum amount of money to the company, in addition to their 
expertise. Later, investors asked for more “skin in the game” on behalf of founders. Since 2006, 
the majority of SPACs require founders to purchase warrants before the IPO. The proceeds from 
these warrants were deposited in the escrow accounts in addition to the IPO proceeds. The 
property of these warrants is similar to warrants for all other investors. If the SPAC is unable to 
execute the merger the warrant’s proceeds are distributed to investors in addition to the 
remaining money in the escrow accounts. Therefore, structuring SPACs in this manner increases 
founders’ commitment to the success of the deal and decreases dilution to the investors 
experienced at the IPO.  
On average, SPAC founders purchased 2.67 million of warrants prior to the IPO at the 
average price of $0.57. In addition to warrant purchases for some SPACs, (mostly when the 
founders are related to or part of investment companies and in order to show full commitment to 
the success of the SPAC), founders purchased units at the IPO and deposited them in the escrow 
account. For example, the chairman of the board of China Fortune purchased 250,000 units at the 
same price as other investors and deposited them in the escrow accounts. 19   On average, 
19 From China Fortune 424B3 form “Our chairman of the board and chief executive officer, has committed to 
purchase from us 250,000 units at $8.00 per unit (for an aggregate purchase price of $2,000,000). This purchase will 
take place on a private placement basis simultaneously with the consummation of this offering. All of the proceeds 
we receive from the purchase will be placed in the trust fund described below. The “insider units” to be 
14 
 
                                                 
combining warrant purchases and unit purchases, SPAC founders commit 3% of the IPO 
proceeds in the escrow accounts. Panel B shows that in the first three years, the average 
contribution by SPAC founders was 0% of total proceeds. In the last three years, the average 
contribution is 5%.  
Underwriters play an important role in the SPAC market. They promote SPACs prior to 
the IPO and make the market for SPACs’ securities after the IPO. In most cases, they are  market 
makers for securities until the final resolution of the SPACs fate through merger or liquidation. 
EarlyBirdCapital (the underwriter of the first SPAC in 2003) is the investment bank that created 
the modern SPACs. They applied experience from prior involvement in blank check markets 
during the 1990’s and structured SPACs in compliance with the SEC rules (and with additional 
guarantees to investors). Until 2006, the SPAC market was characterized by lower tier investing 
banks as underwriters. After 2006, more bulge-bracket investment banks such as Citigroup, JP 
Morgan, Deutsche Bank and Lazard participate in the SPAC market. Their involvement validates 
SPACs structure as a legitimate public investment vehicle. 
On average, total underwriters’ compensation agreed at the IPO date is 6.89% of the IPO 
proceeds. The reported level of compensation is similar to other regular IPO’s.20 In the period of 
2003-2005 underwriters charge SPACs full compensation at the IPO, and total compensation 
was higher than the average, being 10% of gross proceeds in 2003 and 9.17% in 2004. Later, in 
order to appease investors and to lower their dilution, underwriters agreed to defer part of their 
compensation and receive that compensation after the merger, conditional on merger success. 
purchased by our chairman will be identical to the units being offered by this prospectus except that if we call the 
warrants for redemption, the warrants underlying the insider units may be exercisable on a cashless basis so long as 
such warrants are held by our chairman or his affiliates. Additionally, our chairman has waived his right to receive 
distributions upon our liquidation prior to a business combination with respect to the ordinary shares underlying the 
insider units. The insider units have been registered for resale under the registration statement of which this 
prospectus forms a part, but our chairman agreed that the insider units and underlying securities will not be sold or 
transferred by him until after we have completed a business combination. 
20 Chen and Ritter (2000) 
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Across the sample, 2.3% of IPO proceeds (or 33% of total underwriters’ compensation) is 
deferred on behalf of underwriters and deposited in the escrow accounts. In 2008, for example, 
the deferred part of compensation was higher than the compensation collected at the IPO date.  
Underwriters form a syndicate to support SPACs’ IPO. In our sample, the average 
syndicate consists of 3.47 underwriters. Although Panel B does not report a clear pattern in 
dynamics of the number of underwriters in syndicate for the first two years, the number is 
significantly higher than the average with 7 underwriters in 2003 and 4.92 underwriters in 2004. 
Considering that SPACs in such period were smaller and with less units issued, it seems that 
selling SPACs required more effort in the first few years of existence. 
 In every SPAC deal, the underwriters receive an overallotment option and the average 
allotment size is 13.75% of the number of units issued. The most frequent arraignment is one in 
which overallotment size is 15% of the total units issued at the IPO. Typically, the underwriters 
have two weeks to exercise the overallotment option. They receive compensation in the same 
manner for overallotment shares as for the rest of the issuing shares. On average, SPAC investors 
oversubscribe the IPO and underwriters are able to sell 7.7% more shares than planned. The level 
of oversubscription is slightly lower than 9.5% for regular IPOs reported by Ellis et.al (2000). 
4.2 Subsamples analysis 
Table 3 reports SPACs’ characteristics when our sample is divided into two subsamples. 
The first subsample presents the characteristics of all SPACs that focused their merger intentions 
on China as geographical region. The second subsample presents characteristics of SPACs that 
focused their merger intentions elsewhere. The comparison of Chinese focused SPACs with the 
rest of SPACs enables us to determine whether their institutional characteristics differ and 
indirectly evaluate SEC’s decision on reverse mergers in 2011.  
16 
 
In 2003-2011, 41 SPACs announced their intention to execute merger or acquisition with 
companies from China. That represents approximately 22% of all SPACs that conducted the IPO 
in the U.S. markets. In terms of gross proceeds, Chinese focused SPACs raised $2.5 billion. 
Merging SPACs with Chinese companies is beneficial for different reasons. First, SPAC 
investors through SPAC become owners of Chinese companies and reap the potential benefits in 
the future. Second, SPAC offers Chinese companies a pile of cash and public listing in the U.S. 
capital markets. Third, merging of Chinese companies and SPACs (or reverse mergers) include 
Chinese government regulations regarding listing on non-Chinese foreign exchanges. 21  
Table 3 reports that SPACs focused on China are 2.4 times smaller than the rest of SPACs 
($62.04 million vs. 146.70 million). This result shows that SPACs focused on China have similar 
unit price as the rest ($7.76 vs. $8.17) but with fewer units on average (7.77 million vs. 16.95). 
There may be strategic reasons why the size is different. EarlyBirdCapital, one of the main 
promoters and major underwriter of SPACs, states “absence of a true market for small IPOs 
deprives growth-oriented and emerging market investors of new supply of public companies.”22 
There is no significant difference in the average percentage of IPO proceeds deposited in 
the escrow accounts between samples. For China focused SPACs, 96% of the proceeds went to 
the escrow accounts while 97% went to the remaining ones. In a similar manner, reported 
dilution to investors is not different across subsamples (34.46% vs. 34.42%). This evidence 
points that investors in SPACs focused on China at the IPO date are buying into similar 
companies as investors of the remaining SPACs, at least in respect to the “cut” that SPAC 
founders are taking for themselves. 
21 http://www.tmx.com/en/pdf/TSX_SPAC_Presentation.pdf 
22 http://www.foley.com/files/Event/ea8a93d0-d309-463c-835d-
ff17925dee2f/Presentation/EventAttachment/0dc9699a-163a-492f-9f6e-037dbe215f26/EarlyBirdPresentation.pdf 
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The structure of units for both subsamples is very similar. A unit consists of one share and 
1.30 warrants. This evidence points that underwriters do not distinguish at the IPO date what is 
the geography focus of SPACs and do not assign higher risk levels to SPACs focusing on China. 
The only difference is that, on average, warrants issued on Chinese focused SPACs have slightly 
lower exercise price ($6.12 vs. $6.36).  
Founders of SPACs focused on China are 3.5 years younger (48.05 years vs. 51.45 years) 
at the IPO and fewer managers are sponsoring Chinese focused SPAC (5.34 vs. 6.07) on average. 
In the subsample with focus on China, managers buy upfront 2.04 million warrants at average 
price of $0.59 per warrant. Managers of the remaining SPACs have higher absolute number of 
warrants purchased at 2.85 million. However, given the difference in the size of the IPO in the 
percentage terms total commitment of Chinese focused managers is higher than for the SPACs in 
the other subsample (3% of IPO proceeds vs. 2% of IPO proceeds). In addition, on average, 
founders of Chinese SPAC are twice more likely to participate in founding a SPAC previously 
than for the rest of sample (44% vs. 21%). In SPACs’ literature Kim (2009) suggests that 
previous experience of managers in the industry increases success of SPACs to execute merger. 
For example, all SPACs in their prospectuses before the IPO highlight successful prior 
involvement of founders in wide blank check markets and SPACs particularly.23 Following that 
reasoning it is rational that investors in Chinese SPACs would subscribe more to SPACs whose 
managers were already successful in doing the IPO and executing the merger.  
23 Here is a typical excerpt on prior managers’ involvement from B424 form of China Growth Equity Investment 
Ltd “Our management team, including our executive officers and the majority of our directors, has already been 
involved in the initial public offerings and the subsequent consummation of business combinations for two U.S. 
listed prior blank check companies focused on acquisition targets with operations in China as well as having acted as 
advisor to two companies which each completed transactions with blank check companies. Our management team 
played a key role throughout both of these business combination transactions, including identifying the acquisition 
targets, structuring and negotiating the transactions and assisting in obtaining the shareholder approval for such 
transactions”. 
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In both subsamples, underwriting characteristics at the IPO are similar. The underwriters’ 
of Chinese focused SPACs tend to charge higher total underwriting fee ( 7.04% of IPO proceeds 
vs. 6.84%) but they also tend to defer the higher portion of their compensation until the merger 
outcome ( 2.45% of IPO proceeds vs. 2.25%). There is no statistically significant difference in 
the number of underwriters that are involved in the SPACs’ IPO where China focused SPACs 
have slightly lower number of syndicate members (3.27 vs. 3.52). 
SPACs in both subsamples are oversubscribed at the IPO, but in comparison China 
focused SPACs have lower level of oversubscription than the rest of SPACs in the sample 
(7.15% of IPO proceeds vs. 15.64%). 
Reported statistics shows also that the threshold for approval of merger is not statistically 
different across the subsamples. 
4.3 Subsample analysis by the merger outcomes  
Table 4 in Panel A reports the characteristics of SPACs that successfully merged both for 
SPAC with focus on China and with focus elsewhere. Reported statistics resembles differences 
in subsamples reported earlier. Chinese focused SPACs that merged are of smaller size than the 
rest of the SPACs (53.59 million vs. 149.73) and with overall lower percentage of total 
commitment toward IPO proceeds by SPAC founders (1.62% vs. 4.25%). Similarly, Chinese 
SPACs that merged exhibit lower oversubscription than the rest of the SPACs in the sample (6.3 
% of IPO proceeds vs. 15.97%) 
Table 4 in Panel B reports characteristics of liquidated SPACs divided into ones that 
focused their merger toward China and the rest of the SPACs.   
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4.4 Timeline from the IPO to Merger and some Merger Characteristics 
Table 5 in Panel A reports some of the characteristics of SPACs in the interval between 
the IPO and merger and explains the action of involved parties in that period. At the IPO SPAC 
determines the period allowed for finding and acquiring a company. In general, such period is 
two years. Within that period, SPAC founders use their expertise and search for a proper 
company to merge. 
Panel A shows that SPACs on average needed 468 days to announce the merger. For 
Chinese SPACs the average was 492 days, for the rest of SPACs was 462 days. It is realistic to 
assume that Chinese focused SPACs take longer to announce mergers because additional 
complications in the procedure. In some cases, SPACs focused on China asked for extended 
period to prepare the voting on merger. 
After the merger announcement, SPAC managers work on merger details and in the final 
meeting shareholders have to approve the merger. It is specified at the IPO what is the minimum 
percentage of shareholders that have to approve the deal. If the minimum percentage of 
shareholders supports the deal, the SPAC founders execute the merger. Otherwise, the SPAC 
liquidates and the shareholders receive the IPO proceeds. On average, it took 213 days after the 
merger announcement for a SPAC to execute the merger. In the case of Chinese focused SPACs 
that number was 203 days while for the remaining SPACs is 216 days. 
Panel B of Table 5 reports that out of 184 SPACs conducting an IPO by November 2011, 
111 of them executed the merger. We collect the information on the merger size of the SPACs. 
On average, the SPAC merger deal is 1.8 times the size of SPAC IPO or $233 million. For 
SPACs that focused on China the ratio of merger size and IPO size is 2.36 times and for the rest 
of SPACs in the sample 1.79 times. 
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      5. Returns to Chinese Focused SPACs vs. the Rest 
This section calculates returns to SPAC stakeholders for both subsamples around SEC’s 
decision to impose the stricter listing rules on reverse mergers of Chinese origin. Calculating 
returns enables us to provide additional evidence on performance of SPACs for both subsamples. 
SPAC investors at the time of IPO purchase units. Units are composite securities and in 
our sample, on average, one unit consists of 1 share and 1.3 warrants for both subsamples. 
Usually, two weeks after the IPO units are disbanded and separate trading of shares and warrants 
commences on the exchanges where SPACs are listed. In order to make a proper comparison 
while calculating returns, we aggregate the value of all these securities at the time in which the 
SEC announces its decision to impose stricter listing rules on reverse mergers of Chinese origin.  
To make the comparison we form two SPAC portfolios in the following manner. First 
portfolio consists of SPACs that focus their acquisition outside of China. Second portfolio 
consists of SPACs that have Chinese companies as the merger focus or merged with companies 
from China. We assume that at the IPO date an investor purchases one unit of each SPAC and 
hold that unit until the evaluation date which in our case is the mid of October 2011. The 
decision to evaluate the SPAC portfolios around that time is primarily driven by the actions of 
the SEC that finalized in the first week of November. The SEC delisted the number of Chinese 
reverse mergers and imposed stricter rules for them.  
From 184 SPACs conducting the IPO, 93 have available data on units’ value. In some 
cases, we input the value of unit if both share price and warrant price is available. From the 
remaining 91 SPACs on which we do not have trading data, 65 of them liquidated. In this case, 
investors receive the pro-rata proceeds after resolving the trust accounts. On average, aside of the 
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opportunity cost, the investors in these SPACs do not lose money. For the remaining 26 SPACs 
the data is unavailable, mainly because they either turned private companies again or other 
companies acquired them after the initial merger with SPAC. 
Table 5, Panel A, reports overall performance of all SPACs with trading data until the 
cutoff period and performance for the two subsamples. The average SPAC trading in the October 
2011 has 9.5% negative return, where the worst performing SPAC lost 99.63% and the best 
performing SPAC returned $4.125 for each dollar invested. Looking in the subsamples, Chinese 
SPACs at that time were outperforming the rest of SPACs (4.1% vs. -14.8%). 
If SPACs with units trading below $1 are trimmed from the sample, Panel B reports the 
unit price information on 84 SPACs. Overall, aside of the opportunity cost, an investor buying 1 
unit of each SPAC at the IPO and holding it until October 2011 has zero return. In this 
subsample, Chinese SPACs are also outperforming the rest of SPACs in the sample (12% vs. -
5.3%). Our results are in agreement with findings in reverse merger literature. 
   6. Conclusion 
This paper examines SPACs formed with the purpose of acquiring and merging with 
companies in China in period 2004-2011. This analysis will help to answer the following 
questions. First, whether they are different companies than their counterparts focusing their 
merger somewhere else. Second, what are the main features of SPACs that focus on China? 
Finally, this study helps us to answer what is the performance of China focused SPACs 
compared with the rest. 
We offer evidence that similarly to evidence from studies on reverse mergers focusing on 
China, SPACs focused on China are not different in their characteristics from other SPACs. We 
test for the performance of the SPACs focused on China and show that their performance is not 
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inferior to the performance of the other SPACs. On the contrary, an investment in the equally 
weighted portfolio of SPACs with focus on China provides higher absolute return than an 
investment in the equally weighted portfolio of remaining SPACs. 
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Table 1 
 
Sample Statistics: 
 
The table presents summary statistics for the sample period from August 2003 to June 2012. All 
Specified Purpose Acquisition Companies that conducted The Initial Public Offering in that 
period are classified into four subgroups depending on their corporate status on January 1st 2012. 
From the left to the right we report the number of SPACs that: completed the Initial Public 
Offering, the number of companies that completed merger, the number of companies that were 
liquidated and the number of companies that are seeking merger. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year SPAC 
IPO's
SPAC 
China
China as 
% of 
SPACs
IPO 
market 
volume
SPACs 
as % of 
IPO's
SPAC 
size $ 
million
IPO 
market 
size
SPACs 
as % of 
IPO's
2003 1 0 0.00 68 0.014 24 15200 0.002
2004 12 4 0.33 217 0.052 484 42600 0.011
2005 28 2 0.07 192 0.127 2099 33500 0.059
2006 37 6 0.16 196 0.159 3359 42100 0.074
2007 66 14 0.21 213 0.237 12093 48700 0.199
2008 17 8 0.47 31 0.354 3842 24500 0.136
2009 1 1 1.00 63 0.016 36 21800 0.002
2010 7 1 0.14 154 0.043 503 38900 0.013
2011 15 5 0.33 125 0.107 1082 36300 0.029
Total 184 41 0.22 1259 0.128 23522 303600 0.072
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 Table 2 
Table presents sample statistics and the mean and range values for relevant SPAC’s 
characteristics in the period 2003-2011. Variable China explains whether the company at the IPO 
had a focus to merge with company in China.   
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
China 184 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
Units Issued IPO 184 14.90 15.16 0.90 103.50
Unit Price IPO 184 8.08 1.60 6.00 10.10
IPO Proceeds 184 127.83 150.76 9.06 1035.00
Escrow 184 0.97 0.05 0.85 1.03
Dilution 184 34.43 14.17 19.00 89.70
Warrants per Unit 184 1.30 0.47 0.50 2.00
Warrant Strike Price 184 6.30 1.90 3.00 12.00
Prior SPAC Exper. 184 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Number of Founders 184 5.91 1.86 2.00 13.00
Age of Founder 184 50.69 6.90 4.00 63.75
Warrants by Founders 184 2.67 3.01 0.00 16.02
Price of Warrant for Founders 184 0.57 0.47 0.00 1.70
Units by Founders 184 0.12 0.63 0.00 6.00
Founders Commitment pct. 184 3.54 7.51 0.00 72.00
Underwriters Fee Total 184 6.89 1.41 2.25 10.00
Underwriters fee at IPO 184 4.20 1.71 1.00 9.00
Deferred Compensation 184 2.30 1.53 0.00 5.40
Underwriters Allowance 184 0.40 0.76 0.00 3.00
Syndicate number 184 3.47 1.78 1.00 10.00
Overallotment  Shares pct. 184 13.75 13.79 0.73 90.00
Overallotment  Shares No. 184 2.06 2.07 0.11 13.50
Overallotment  Exercise pct. 184 0.56 0.48 -0.14 2.53
Threshold 184 32.35 20.87 20.00 94.40
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 Table 2 B 
Table reports major characteristics of SPACs year by year from 2003 – 2011. Variable Number 
of SPAC IPO’s represents the total number of SPAC IPO’s in the given year. Variable China 
Focused SPAC represents the number of SPACs IPO’s with focus on China 
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of SPAC  IPO's 1 12 28 37 66 17 1 7 15 
China Focused SPAC 0 4 2 6 14 8 1 1 5 
Units Issued IPO 4.03 6.67 10.97 11.83 20.50 23.04 3.60 7.18 7.67 
Unit Price IPO 6.00 6.34 6.86 7.47 8.48 9.18 10.00 10.00 9.33 
IPO Proceeds 24.15 40.35 74.95 90.79 183.23 226.03 36.00 71.79 72.10 
Escrow  0.85 0.87 0.92 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.03 1.01 1.01 
Dilution  28.80 31.66 29.50 30.12 29.67 30.64 29.80 55.83 72.39 
Warrants per Unit 2.00 1.92 1.68 1.49 1.08 1.06 1.00 1.00 0.97 
Warrant Strike Price 5.00 5.00 5.25 5.42 6.15 6.38 11.50 10.93 9.66 
Prior SPAC exper. 1.00 0.25 0.21 0.19 0.26 0.35 0.00 0.29 0.40 
Age of founder 4.00 4.58 5.46 5.70 6.52 5.82 3.00 6.57 5.73 
Warrants by Founders 0.00 0.00 0.04 1.10 3.97 5.16 3.60 4.80 4.17 
Price of warrant for founders 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.39 0.88 0.93 0.50 0.68 0.61 
Units by Founders 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.19 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Founders commitment 0.00 0.00 0.47 2.64 5.87 4.98 1.80 3.28 2.90 
Underwriters Fee Total 10.00 9.17 7.43 6.86 6.97 6.84 7.00 4.48 4.73 
Underwriters fee at IPO 7.00 6.83 6.07 4.49 3.67 2.84 3.00 2.15 2.58 
Deferred Compensation 0.00 0.00 0.57 2.20 3.14 3.83 4.00 2.34 2.15 
Underwriters allowance 3.00 2.33 0.79 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Syndicate number 7.00 4.92 3.32 3.81 3.30 3.18 3.00 3.57 2.53 
Overallotment  shares pct. 0.53 0.88 1.55 1.63 2.79 3.27 0.54 1.05 1.09 
Overallotment  shares pct. 3.50 5.86 10.33 10.87 18.67 21.79 3.60 7.01 7.28 
Overallotment  exercise pct. 1.00 0.93 0.50 0.58 0.63 0.46 0.00 0.27 0.32 
Threshold 20.00 20.00 20.00 21.01 28.30 32.35 81.00 79.79 86.55 
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 Table 3 
Table reports characteristics of two subsamples. In the first subsample characteristics of SPACs 
with focus on China are reported. Second subsample reports characteristics of other SPACs in 
the sample. Two variables in the last columns represent the following. Variable Ch/R divides the 
mean value of characteristic of China focused SPACs with the mean characteristics of the rest of 
the sample. Variable p-valu represents standard p-value test on whether the means are different 
at 5% level of significance 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
Variable Obs MeanStd.Dev Min Max Obs MeanStd.Dev Min Max Ch/R p-valu
China Focused SPAC 41 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 143 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Units Issued IPO 41 7.77 6.61 2.30 32.97 143 16.95 16.28 0.90 103.50 0.46 0.000
Unit Price IPO 41 7.76 1.50 6.00 10.00 143 8.17 1.62 6.00 10.10 0.95 0.063
IPO Proceeds 41 62.04 57.33 18.98 263.76 143 146.70 163.57 9.06 1035.00 0.42 0.000
Escrow 41 0.96 0.05 0.85 1.03 143 0.97 0.04 0.85 1.03 1.00 0.470
Dilution 41 34.46 12.74 25.00 77.60 143 34.42 14.60 19.00 89.70 1.00 0.488
Warrants per Unit 41 1.30 0.49 0.50 2.00 143 1.30 0.46 0.50 2.00 1.01 0.492
Warrant Strike Price 41 6.12 1.98 5.00 12.00 143 6.36 1.89 3.00 12.00 0.96 0.335
Prior SPAC exper. 41 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 143 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 2.09 0.987
Number of Founders 41 5.34 2.04 2.00 10.00 143 6.07 1.78 2.00 13.00 0.88 0.008
Age of founder 41 48.05 7.34 31.33 61.50 143 51.45 6.60 4.00 63.75 0.93 0.010
Warrants by Founders 41 2.04 1.94 0.00 7.50 143 2.85 3.23 0.00 16.02 0.72 0.062
Price warrant  found. 41 0.59 0.43 0.00 1.20 143 0.57 0.48 0.00 1.70 1.04 0.451
Units by Founders 41 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.25 143 0.16 0.71 0.00 6.00 0.10 0.000
Founders commitment 41 1.75 1.67 0.00 7.50 143 4.05 8.41 0.00 72.00 0.43 0.000
Underwriters Fee Total 41 7.04 1.51 3.50 10.00 143 6.84 1.39 2.25 10.00 1.03 0.445
Underwriters fee at IPO 41 4.09 1.88 1.50 9.00 143 4.23 1.66 1.00 8.00 0.97 0.106
Deferred Compensation 41 2.45 1.56 0.00 4.50 143 2.25 1.52 0.00 5.40 1.09 0.760
Underwriters allowance 41 0.50 0.86 0.00 3.00 143 0.37 0.72 0.00 3.00 1.37 0.848
Syndicate number 41 3.27 1.66 1.00 8.00 143 3.52 1.82 1.00 10.00 0.93 0.352
Overallot. shares pct. 41 7.15 6.23 2.20 31.25 143 15.64 14.76 0.73 90.00 0.46 0.000
Overallot. shares No. 41 1.07 0.93 0.33 4.69 143 2.34 2.22 0.11 13.50 0.46 0.000
Overallot.  exercise pct. 41 0.62 0.44 0.00 1.00 143 0.55 0.49 -0.14 2.53 1.12 0.375
Threshold 41 35.50 22.08 20.00 90.20 143 31.45 20.51 20.00 94.40 1.13 0.922
SPACs with focus on China SPACs with focus outside of China
29 
 
Table 4. 
Panel A reports characteristics of SPACs that merged divided into two subsamples. In the first 
subsample characteristics of SPACs merging with Chinese companies are presented. In the 
second characteristics of SPACs that have NonChina focus are presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A.
Variable Obs Mean td. Dev. Min Max Obs MeanStd. Dev. Min Max
Units Issued IPO 29 6.83 5.28 3.45 31.25 82 17.37 16.74 0.90 103.50
Unit Price IPO 29 7.66 1.42 6.00 10.00 82 8.08 1.71 6.00 10.10
IPO Proceeds 29 53.59 45.56 20.70 250.00 82 149.73 166.88 9.06 1035.00
Escrow 29 0.96 0.06 0.85 1.03 82 0.96 0.05 0.85 1.03
Dilution 29 32.66 11.18 25.00 73.67 82 35.82 16.38 19.00 89.70
Warrants per Unit 29 1.34 0.48 1.00 2.00 82 1.32 0.48 0.50 2.00
Warrant Strike Price 29 5.89 1.81 5.00 12.00 82 6.40 2.00 3.00 12.00
Prior SPAC exper. 29 0.45 0.51 0.00 1.00 82 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
Number of Founders 29 5.52 1.86 3.00 9.00 82 6.09 1.93 2.00 13.00
Age of founder 29 48.18 6.40 37.00 60.25 82 50.82 7.44 4.00 63.75
Warrants by Founders 29 1.85 1.78 0.00 7.50 82 2.75 3.33 0.00 16.02
Price of warrant for founders 29 0.62 0.44 0.00 1.20 82 0.49 0.48 0.00 1.70
Units by Founders 29 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.17 82 0.19 0.89 0.00 6.00
Founders commitment 29 1.62 1.65 0.00 7.50 82 4.25 10.34 0.00 72.00
Underwriters Fee Total 29 4.24 2.05 1.50 9.00 82 4.37 1.83 1.00 8.00
Underwriters fee at IPO 29 7.34 1.40 5.00 10.00 82 6.81 1.54 2.25 10.00
Deferred Compensation 29 2.54 1.61 0.00 4.50 82 1.95 1.62 0.00 5.40
Underwriters allowance 29 0.57 0.93 0.00 3.00 82 0.49 0.85 0.00 3.00
Syndicate number 29 3.07 1.58 1.00 8.00 82 3.65 1.83 1.00 10.00
Overallotment  shares pct. 29 6.30 5.29 3.00 31.25 82 15.97 14.87 0.73 90.00
Overallotment  shares No. 29 0.95 0.79 0.45 4.69 82 2.39 2.23 0.11 13.50
Overallotment  exercise pct. 29 0.66 0.43 0.00 1.00 82 0.55 0.46 0.00 1.58
Threshold 29 33.01 18.67 20.00 85.00 82 32.84 23.62 20.00 94.40
China Spacs that Merged NonChina SPACs that Merged
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Panel B reports characteristics of SPACs that liquidated divided into two subsamples. In the first 
subsample characteristics of SPACs with the intention to merge with Chinese companies are 
presented. In the second characteristics of SPACs that had intention to merge with NonChina 
companies are presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel B.
Variable Obs Mean td. Dev. Min Max Obs MeanStd. Dev. Min Max
Units Issued IPO 12 10.05 8.93 2.30 32.97 61 16.38 15.77 2.88 92.00
Unit Price IPO 12 8.00 1.71 6.00 10.00 61 8.30 1.50 6.00 10.10
IPO Proceeds 12 82.45 77.61 18.98 263.76 61 142.63 160.31 18.98 920.00
Escrow 12 0.97 0.05 0.85 1.02 61 0.98 0.03 0.86 1.02
Dilution 12 38.83 15.58 28.00 77.60 61 32.53 11.65 22.20 81.00
Warrants per Unit 12 1.21 0.50 0.50 2.00 61 1.26 0.44 1.00 2.00
Warrant Strike Price 12 6.67 2.33 5.00 11.50 61 6.30 1.74 4.50 12.00
Prior SPAC exper. 12 0.42 0.51 0.00 1.00 61 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Number of Founders 12 4.92 2.47 2.00 10.00 61 6.05 1.59 2.00 10.00
Age of founder 12 47.73 9.57 31.33 61.50 61 52.28 5.20 41.50 63.20
Warrants by Founders 12 2.49 2.31 0.00 6.60 61 2.99 3.12 0.00 15.60
Price of warrant for founders 12 0.50 0.44 0.00 1.00 61 0.66 0.45 0.00 1.20
Units by Founders 12 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.25 61 0.11 0.37 0.00 2.50
Founders commitment 12 2.06 1.76 0.00 6.20 61 3.78 4.79 0.00 30.00
Underwriters Fee Total 12 3.72 1.41 2.00 7.00 61 4.03 1.39 1.50 8.00
Underwriters fee at IPO 12 6.30 1.57 3.50 9.00 61 6.89 1.16 3.00 10.00
Deferred Compensation 12 2.25 1.49 0.00 4.00 61 2.66 1.28 0.00 5.00
Underwriters allowance 12 0.33 0.65 0.00 2.00 61 0.20 0.46 0.00 2.00
Syndicate number 12 3.75 1.82 1.00 7.00 61 3.36 1.80 1.00 9.00
Overallotment  shares pct. 12 9.19 7.95 2.20 30.00 61 15.21 14.71 2.50 80.00
Overallotment  shares No. 12 1.38 1.19 0.33 4.50 61 2.27 2.21 0.38 12.00
Overallotment  exercise pct. 12 0.52 0.46 0.00 1.00 61 0.55 0.53 -0.14 2.53
Threshold 12 41.50 28.82 20.00 90.20 61 29.58 15.37 20.00 87.00
China Spacs that Liquidated NonChina SPACs that Liquidated
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Table 5 
Table in Panel A reports the speed of the announcement of intent to merge and time needed to 
execute the merger from the announcement date. Variable IPO_ANN represents the time it takes 
a SPAC management to announce the merger combination for all companies in the sample. 
Variable IPO_ANNRest calculates the time needed to announce merger intention for nonChinese 
SPACs. IPO_ANNChina calculates the time between the IPO and merger announcement for 
China focuses SPACs. ANN_MERR calculates time between the merger announcement and 
actual merger. Panel B reports the size of merger deals for the whole sample and for subsamples 
 
                    
  
Panel A
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
IPO_ANN 183 468.37 185.39 80 855
IPO_ANNRest 143 461.78 190.01 80 855
IPO_ANNChina 40 491.93 167.97 102 736
ANN_MERR 110 212.82 137.56 4 721
ANN_MERRest 81 216.30 128.18 7 644
ANN_MERChina 29 203.10 163.05 4 721
Panel B
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Mergersize 113 233.80 381.71 7 3300
China 29 146.65 174.26 13.95 770
NoChina 84 263.88 427.55 7 3300
China/NoChina 0.56
p value 0.041 **
Speed of Announcement and Merger Comparison
Merger Size Comparison
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Table 6: 
This table reports returns to SPAC investors. Panel A variables are the following: BHAR_T = 
absolute buy and hold return on the unit equaly weighted portfolio of SPACs from the day of the 
IPO until the cutoff date. BHAR_R = absolute buy and hold return on the unit equaly weighted 
portfolio of SPACs from the day of the IPO until the cutoff date for SPACs that focus outside of 
China. BHAR_C = absolute buy and hold return on the unit equaly weighted portfolio of SPACs 
from the day of the IPO until the cutoff date for SPACs that focus on China. BHAR_T = 0.905 
means that an investor with investment of $1 would get back $0.905, similarly for other returns. 
Panel B calculates returns in the same manner but SPACs with the trading price of units lower 
than $1 are eliminated from the sample 
 
                        
 
 
 
 
Panel A
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
BHAR_T 93 0.905 0.827 0.004 4.125
BHAR_R 67 0.853 0.729 0.004 3.070
BHAR_C 26 1.041 1.041 0.011 4.125
Panel B
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
BHAR_T 84 0.999 0.816 0.113 4.125
BHAR_R 60 0.948 0.712 0.113 3.000
BHAR_C 24 1.126 1.040 0.120 4.125
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